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Abstract. Preventing fake or duplicate e-identities (aka sybils) from
joining an e-community may be crucial to its survival, especially if it
utilizes a consensus protocol among its members or employs democratic
governance, where sybils can undermine consensus, tilt decisions, or even
take over. Here, we explore the use of a trust graph of identities, with trust
edges representing trust among identity owners, to allow a community to
grow without increasing its sybil penetration. Since identities are admitted
to the e-community based on their trust by existing e-community members,
corrupt identities, which may trust sybils, also pose a threat to the e-
community. Sybils and their corrupt perpetrators are together referred
to as Byzantines, and our overarching aim is to limit their penetration
into an e-community. Our key tool in achieving this is graph conductance,
and our key assumption is that honest people are averse to corrupt
ones and tend to distrust them. Of particular interest is keeping the
fraction of Byzantines below one third, as it would allow the use of
Byzantine Agreement [13] for consensus as well as for sybil-resilient social
choice [16,20] and sybil-resilient parameter update [19]. We consider
sequences of incrementally growing trust graphs and show that, under
our key assumption and additional requirements, including keeping the
conductance of the community trust graph sufficiently high, a community
may grow safely.
Keywords: graph theory, conductance, sybil resilience
1 Introduction
We wish to identify conditions under which an e-community of predominantly-
genuine (truthful and unique) e-identities, may grow without increasing the
penetration of sybil (fake or duplicate) e-identities. Our particular context of
interest is e-democracy [17,18], where a sovereign e-community conducts its affairs
via egalitarian decision processes, although another motivation is the task of
growing a permissioned distributed system. We consider an initial community
with low sybil penetration that wishes to admit new members without admitting
too many sybils. As it is not realistic to expect that no sybils will be admitted,
our goal is to keep the fraction of sybils below a certain threshold. In a separate
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paper [16], we show that an e-democracy can tolerate up to one-third sybil
penetration and still function democratically. Still, the fewer the sybils, the
smaller the supermajority needed to keep the decision-making safe against them.
We model an e-community via a trust graph with a vertex for each identity
and with edges representing trust relations between the owners of the correspond-
ing identities (formal definitions in Section 2). We consider genuine and sybil
identities, and refer to the genuine identities that do not trust sybils as honest
and those that do as corrupt. Furthermore, as we are interested in an incremental
admission process that grows the initial community, we consider sequences of
trust graphs that capture such incremental changes.
We are interested in identifying sufficient conditions on such graphs, e.g. the
type of identities in the graph, their relative fractions, and their trust relations,
under which a community may grow while keeping the fraction of sybils in it low.
To achieve this, our key assumption is that honest identities tend to trust honest
identities rather than corrupt ones, and our key tool is graph conductance.
Related work. We review existing work which helps in clarifying the differences
to our model: A large portion of the literature on sybil attacks (see, e.g., [6,15,14]
and their citations) is focused on sybil detection, where the task is to tell the
sybil agents from the honest ones. Of particular interest is the approach initiated
by Yu et al. [26], which relies on structural properties of the underlying social
network. Yu et al. show how to separate the honest and sybil regions by leveraging
the relatively few number of edges between them. This framework was studied
further [24,5,21,22,23,4].As pointed out by Alvisi et al. [2], however, such attempts
to recover the entire sybil region may potentially occur only in instances where
the honest region is sufficiently connected, which is rarely the case in actual social
networks. Consequently, Alvisi et al. suggest a more modest goal of producing a
whitelist of honest vertices in the graph with respect to a given agent; that is, a
local sybil detection scheme, in contrast to the global ones proposed before.
A problem of a similar flavor is that of corruption detection in networks,
posed by Alon et al. [1] and later refined by Jin et al. [12]. This setting, inspired
by auditing networks, consists of a graph with each of its vertices being either
truthful or corrupt, where the overall goal is to detect the corrupt region. In
contrast to the sybil detection problem, the corrupt agents are assumed to be
immersed throughout the network, and the main assumption here is that each
agent may accurately determine the true label of its neighbors and report it to
a central authority. The authors show how good connectivity properties of the
graph allows an approximate recovery of the truthful and corrupt regions.
We note that social networks have some special structure, e.g. having low
diameters (a.k.a., the small world phenomena [7]) or fragmented to highly-
connected clusters with low connectivity between different clusters. Moreover,
as observed by some researchers [2,5,25], the attacker’s inability to maintain
sufficiently many attack edges typically results in certain “bottlenecks”, which
can be utilized to pin-point the sybil regions.
Informal Model. While the problem we address is related to sybil detection,
and indeed we incorporate some of the insights of the works discussed above, our
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the general setting: The white vertices (honest identities) and
grey vertices (corrupt identities) form the set of genuine identities, while grey vertices
(corrupt identities) and black vertices (sybil identities) form the set of Byzantines. Bold
edges represent attack edges. The white vertex with a grey heart in it represents an
identity that is “corrupt at heart”, as currently it does not trust any sybil, but in the
future it will; thus, the edge connecting it to the honest identity to its right is an attack
edge as well. The circled area contains the current community that wishes to grow.
Notice that the nine identities in the community contain one sybil and two corrupt
identities, thus in particular the community’s Byzantine penetration is β = 1/3 and the
sybil penetration is σ = 1/9. The fraction of internal attack edges to the volume of the
honest part of the community graph, defined below, is γ = 1/8.
main goal is different: Safe community growth. We aim to find conditions under
which a community may grow without increasing the fraction of hostile members
within it; but without necessarily identifying explicitly who is hostile and who is
not. An additional difference from existing literature is our notions of identity
and trust. Specifically, existing works consider identities or agents of only two
types, “good” and “bad”, with various names for the two categories. Our notion
of identities is more refined and, we believe, may be closer to reality.
In particular, we consider genuine and sybil identities, with the intention
that in a real-world scenario these would be characterized by the nature of their
representation: genuine identities are truthful and unique, and sybil identities are
fake or duplicate. We further distinguish between two types of genuine identities,
based on their behavior : honest, which do not form trust relations with sybils,
and corrupt, which do. This behavioral distinction is captured formally in our
model. We naturally assume that the corrupt identities are the creators and
operators of the sybils and that, in the worst case, all sybils and their corrupt
perpetrators may cooperate, hence we label them together as Byzantines, and
aim to limit their fraction within the community.
We thus begin with a unified formal model of such identities and their trust
graph, consisting of vertices that represent identities and edges that represent
trust relations among the owners of such identities. As we consider the task of
sybil-resilient community growth, we define the community history that aims to
capture the incremental changes a community trust graph undergoes over discrete
time steps. In order to properly characterize identities, we first employ the basic
distinction between genuine and sybil identities. Then, using the community
history, we make a further delicate distinction within genuine identities between
honest identities, which never trust sybils, and corrupt identities, which may trust
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sybils and, furthermore, may cooperate with other corrupt or sybil community
members to introduce sybils into the community.
Some assumptions on the power of the sybils and their perpetrators is needed;
otherwise there is no hope in achieving our goal. Intuitively, our key assumption is
that honest identities are averse to corrupt identities, and hence are not likely to
trust them. We call trust edges that connect honest and corrupt identities attack
edges. So, loosely speaking, we assume that there are not too many attack edges.
We view this assumption as a realistic relaxation of the assumption made in
some related works [1,12], which assume that truthful agents are able to identify
precisely whether a neighbor is corrupt or not. Figure 1 illustrates our general
setting.
High-level approach. Our approach for admitting a new identity to the com-
munity relies upon the conductance of the subgraph that includes the current
community together with the potential candidate to be admitted. Our ability to
protect the graph from Byzantine penetration is based on our key assumption
that, while there could be arbitrarily many Byzantines wanting to enter the
growing community, they will have limited connectivity to the current community.
Indeed, this observation was applied in the context of sybil detection [2,26,24,25].
In general, while the conductance of the whole network is typically fairly low,
the conductance of the subgraphs restricted to each cluster may be high. In
that sense, following Alvisi et al. [2], we adopt a local perspective and focus on
the conductance of our community, regardless of the conductance of the entire
network. In contrast to Alvisi et al. [2], however, we are interested in growing the
community and not in whitelisting. Unlike the situation treated by Alvisi et al. [2],
which can be viewed as whitelisting, initiated at a singleton community (i.e. from
a single non-sybil vertex), here we consider arbitrarily-large communities and
aim to bound, but not detect or eliminate, the sybils in them.
Specifically, our framework makes use of a “target conductance” parameter
Φ, and aims to grow, i.e., admit new members, while retaining a conductance
of at least Φ at the larger community. Assuming that the community harbors
a limited number of attack edges and the relative fraction of Byzantines in the
initial community is bounded, we show how to safely grow an initial community.
2 Preliminaries
We provide some needed definitions regarding graphs and conductance. Let G =
(V,E) be an undirected graph. The degree of a vertex x ∈ V is deg(x) := |{y ∈
V | (x, y) ∈ E}|. G is d-regular if deg(x) = d holds for each x ∈ V . The volume of
a given subset A ⊆ V is the sum of degrees of its vertices, vol(A) := ∑x∈A deg(x).
Additionally, we denote the subgraph induced on the set of vertices A as G|A, by
degA(x) the degree of vertex x ∈ A in G|A, and by volA(B) :=
∑
x∈B degA(x)
the volume of a set B ⊆ A in G|A. Given two subsets A,B ⊆ V , the size of the
cut between A and B is denoted by e(A,B) = |{(x, y) ∈ E | x ∈ A, y ∈ B}|.
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Definition 1 (Conductance). Let G = (V,E) be a graph. The conductance
of G is defined by: Φ(G) = min∅6=A⊂V
e(A,Ac)
min{vol(A),vol(Ac)} . (where A
c := V \A is
the complement of A.)
Remark 1. Generally speaking, graph conductance aims to measure the connec-
tivity of the graph by quantifying the minimal cut normalized by the volume
of its smaller subset. Conductance should be thought of as the weighted and
irregular analogue of edge expansion [9], where both notions are essentially equiv-
alent for regular graphs. To get a quantitative grip of this measure, notice that
for all graphs, Φ ∈ [0, 12 ]. Intuitively, the conductance of a highly connected
graph approaches 12 . E.g., cliques and complete bipartite graphs satisfy Φ =
1
2 ,
while in a poorly connected graph this measure may be arbitrarily small; e.g., a
disconnected graph satisfies Φ = 0.
While determining the exact conductance of a given graph is known to
be coNP-hard [3], the Cheeger inequality provides a direct relation between
conductance of a graph and the second eigenvalue of its random walk matrix.
Lemma 1. (Cheeger inequality [10]) Let G be a graph with conductance Φ, and
let λn ≤ ... ≤ λ2 ≤ λ1 denote the spectrum of its random walk matrix. Then,
Φ2
2 ≤ 1−
√
1− Φ2 ≤ 1− λ2 ≤ 2Φ.
Consequently, spectral methods, together with the Cheeger inequality, provide
efficient approximation algorithms for measuring conductance. We refer the reader
to [9,11] for comprehensive surveys and discussions.
3 Formal Model
Community Trust Graphs. The relation between people and their identities
is rich and multifaceted. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that some
identities are genuine and others are not, in which case they are called sybils.
We represent trust relations among identities via a trust graph, in which vertices
represent identities and edges represent trust among identities.
Definition 2. A trust graph G = (V,E) is an undirected graph with vertices
that represent identities and edges that represent trust among them.
As we are interested in a community that grows within such a trust graph,
next we introduce the concept of a community trust graph.
Definition 3. A community trust graph G = (A, V,E) is a trust graph with
vertices V , edges E, and a community A ⊆ V , where E ⊆ A× V . (Notice that,
since E ⊆ A×V , all edges in a community trust graph have at least one endpoint
inside the community A.)
Community Histories and Transitions. Our aim is to find conditions under
which a community may grow safely. Hence we consider sequences of community
graphs, obtained by applying elementary transitions of adding a member to the
community or adding/removing an edge:
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Definition 4 (Elementary Community Transition). Let G = (A, V,E) and
G′ = (A′, V, E′) be two community graphs with the same set of vertices V . We
say that G′ is obtained from G by an elementary community transition, and we
denote it by G→ G′, if:
– A′ = A ∪ {x}, x ∈ (V \A), E′ = E, or
– E′ = E ∪ {e}, e ∈ (A× V \ E), A = A′, or
– E′ = E \ {e}, e ∈ E, A = A′.
Definition 5 (Community History). A community history GV over a set
of vertices V is a (possibly infinite) sequence of community trust graphs GV =
G1, G2, . . . with vertices V such that Gi → Gi+1 holds for every i ∈ 1, 2, . . ..3
Types of Identities. We assume identities of two types, genuine and sybil. Next,
we use community histories to distinguish between two types of genuine identities
– honest and corrupt: we say that an identity is honest in a community history
if it never partakes in an attack edge in this history, and corrupt if it does. We
then lump together sybils and corrupt identities and call them Byzantines.
The rationale is that we are interested in bounding the number of sybils in
the graph, not only at the present but also in the future. Hence, we need to
bound also all potential sybil perpetrators, who may establish trust edges with
sybils in the future, in an attempt to introduce them into the community. Hence,
at any point in time (community graph in a community history) , a corrupt
identity may be only “corrupt at heart”, with no action as-of-yet to demonstrate
its corruption; and our key assumption is that honest identities are averse to
corrupt identities even if they are only corrupt at heart.
Below and in the rest of the paper we use disjoint union A = B unionmulti C as a
shorthand for A = B ∪ C, B ∩ C = ∅.
Definition 6 (Types of identities, Attack edges, Sybil penetration).
Let V be a set of vertices that consist of two disjoint subsets V = T unionmulti S of
genuine T and sybil S vertices, and let GV be a community history over V . Then,
a genuine vertex t ∈ T is corrupt in GV if it trusts a sybil at anytime in GV ,
namely, there is some (t, s) ∈ E, with t ∈ T , s ∈ S, for some G = (A, V,E) ∈ GV .
A genuine vertex that is not corrupt is said to be honest. Thus, GV partitions the
genuine identities T = H unionmulti C into honest H and corrupt C identities. An edge
(h, c) ∈ E is an attack edge if h ∈ H and c ∈ C. The sybil penetration σ(G) of
a community trust graph G = (A, V,E) ∈ GV is
σ(G) =
|A ∩ S|
|A| .
Remark 2. An important observation is that an attack edge (h, c) may be intro-
duced into a community trust graph in a community history, and be defined as
such, even if the corruption of c is still latent in this community trust graph,
namely before a trust edge (c, s) between c and a sybil s is introduced.
3 As the set of vertices V is fixed in a community history, it does not explicitly model
the birth and death of people; modeling this aspect is the subject of future work.
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Bounded attacks and resilience. Our key assumption is that honest people
tend to trust honest people and distrust corrupt people; we capture the degree
in which this is the case by the following parameter γ:
Definition 7 (γ-bounded attack). Let GV be a community history over V =
T unionmulti S that partitions T = H unionmulti C into honest H and corrupt C identities. A
community trust graph G = (A, V,E) ∈ GV has a γ-bounded attack if
e(A ∩H,A ∩ C)
volA(A ∩H) ≤ γ .
That is, γ is an upper bound on the fraction of attack edges within A to the
volume of the honest subset of A. In the worst case, sybils and their corrupt
perpetrators would cooperate; thus, to allow for incremental community growth
we must bound their combined presence in the community, as defined next:
Definition 8 (Byzantines and their Penetration). Let GV be a community
history over V = T unionmulti S that partitions T = H unionmulti C into honest H and corrupt
C identities. Then, a vertex v ∈ V is Byzantine if it is a sybil or corrupt and
the Byzantines B = S ∪ C are the union of the sybil and corrupt vertices. The
Byzantine penetration β(G) of a community trust graph G = (A, V,E) ∈ GV is
β(G) =
|A ∩B|
|A| .
As A = (A ∩H) unionmulti (A ∩ B), it would occasionally be convenient to use the
equivalence between Byzantine penetration to the community A and the fraction
of Byzantines w.r.t. genuine identities in A. Formally,
|A ∩B|
|A| ≤ β iff
|A ∩B|
|A ∩H| ≤
β
1− β . (1)
As mentioned above, it is necessary to have some assumptions on the quality
of our trust graphs.The next definition, of α-solidarity, measures a certain aspect
of the connectivity within the community; roughly speaking, it requires that each
vertex in the community would have many neighbors inside the community:
Definition 9 (α-solidarity). Given a community trust graph G = (A, V,E), a
vertex a ∈ A satisfies α-solidarity if:
|{x ∈ A | (a, x) ∈ E}|
d
≥ α.
where d is the maximal degree of G. The graph G satisfies α-solidarity if every
a ∈ A satisfies α-solidarity.
The following definition combines some of the definitions above. Note that in
this definition β is a free parameter.
8 Shahaf et al.
Definition 10 (Community graph resilience). Let G ∈ GV be a community
trust graph in a community history GV over V , α ∈ [0, 1], and β, γ ∈ [0, 12 ]. We
say that G is (α, β, γ)-resilient if the following hold: 1) G satisfies α-solidarity;
2) G has a γ-bounded attack; and 3) Φ(G|A) > γα ·
(
1−β
β
)
.
Remark 3. To internalize the above definition, consider the options available to a
community that wishes to achieve resilience to a given Byzantine penetration β:
(i) to increase solidarity, α, up to 1; (ii) to increase conductance, Φ, up to 1/2; (iii)
or to curb the attack, γ, down to 0. However: (i) increasing solidarity may prevent
the community from admitting additional members, defeating the purpose of
community growth; (ii) increasing conductance may require community members
who do not know each other to trust each other, defeating the notion of trust;
and (iii) curbing the attack will require the community to expose sybils and their
corrupt perpetrators, which is an effort. In summary, achieving (α, β, γ)-resilience
for a given β is a challenge, and addressing it will require a community to craft
a balance between its desire to grow, the measures it is willing to undertake to
support such growth, and the risks it is willing to undertake in order to grow.
Lemma 2. Let G ∈ GV be a community trust graph in a community history GV
over V , α ∈ [0, 1], β, β(G) ∈ [0, 12 ] and γ ∈ [0, 12 ]. If G is (α, β, γ)-resilient, then
G has sybil penetration σ(G) ≤ β − γ(1− β).
Proof. From the conductance of G we have that
γ
α
·
(
1− β
β
)
< Φ(G|A) ≤ e(H ∩A,B ∩A)
volA(B ∩A)
≤ d · |C ∩A|
αd · |B ∩A| =
1
α
·
(
1− |S ∩A||B ∩A|
)
,
where the second inequality applies the definition of conductance and the fact
that volA(B ∩A) ≤ volA(H ∩A), due to Byzantine penetration not greater than
1
2 ; and the third stems from the requirement that each vertex is of degree at least
αd, and the fact that only corrupt identities obtain attack edges, and each of
them is of degree at most d. The last inequality applies the partition B = C unionmulti S.
Algebraic manipulations yield |S ∩A| ≤ |B ∩A| ·
(
1− γ ·
(
1−β
β
))
. Thus,
σ(G) =
|S ∩A|
|A| ≤
|B ∩A|
|A| ·
(
1− γ ·
(
1− β
β
))
≤ β ·
(
1− γ ·
(
1− β
β
))
= β − γ(1− β) . uunionsq
4 Safe Community Growth
The following main theorem provides a sufficient condition for safe community
growth: It guarantees low Byzantine penetration in a community trust graph G′
if it has certain properties and is obtained via an elementary transition from a
community trust graph G that has low Byzantine penetration.
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Remark 4. This theorem can be understood in at least two ways: (i) as offering
formal guidelines to a community wishing to grow without increasing its sybil
penetration; and (ii) as suggesting an algorithm that incrementally admits new
identities to the community whenever the conditions of Definition 10 hold, thus
guaranteeing low Byzantine penetration rate in the evolving community.
Theorem 1. Let GV be a community history over V and let G,G′ ∈ GV be
two consecutive elements of GV , where G′ is obtained from G by an elementary
operation of vertex addition. Let α ∈ [0, 1], β(G) ≤ 12 − 1|A| and γ ∈ [0, 12 ].
If G′ is (α, β, γ)-resilient, for some free parameter β ≤ 12 , then β(G′) ≤ β′.
Before proving the above main theorem we present a corollary that considers
community growth over time.
Corollary 1. Let GV = G1, G2, . . . be a community history over V . Let α ∈ [0, 1],
γ ∈ [0, 12 ], β ≤ 12 − 1|A1| , and assume that β(G1) ≤ β.
If Every graph G ∈ GV obtained from its predecessor in GV via vertex addi-
tion elementary operation is (α, β, γ)-resilient, then every member G ∈ GV has
Byzantine penetration β(G) ≤ β and sybil penetration σ(G) ≤ β − γ(1− β).
Proof. Towards contradiction, let Gk be the first community graph for which
β(Gk) > β. An elementary operation G→ G′ involving either edge addition or
edge removal does not alter the proportion of Byzantines within the community,
so Gk must be obtained via vertex addition from Gk−1. As a proper community
history GV = G1, G2, ... satisfies A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ ..., we have β ≤ 12 − 1|A1| ≤
1
2− 1|Ak−1| . As k is the minimal index for which β(Gk) > β, we have β(Gk−1) ≤ β,
contradicting Theorem 1. Sybil penetration follows Lemma 2. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let d > 0 be the maximal degree of the vertices in
A′. Notice first that |A′ ∩ B| ≤ |A ∩ B| + 1 ≤
(
1
2 − 1|A|
)
|A| + 1 = |A|2 < |A
′|
2 ,
where the second inequality follows from the Byzantine penetration in G. It
follows therefore that |A′ ∩ B| < |A′ ∩H|. Also, from α-solidarity we get that
volA′(A
′ ∩B) ≥ αd|A′ ∩B| and volA′(A′ ∩H) ≥ αd|A′ ∩H| > αd|A′ ∩B|. Using
the conductance of G′ it follows specifically that:
e(A′ ∩H,A′ ∩B)
αd|A′ ∩B| ≥
e(A′ ∩H,A′ ∩B)
min{vol(A′ ∩H), vol(A′ ∩B)} >
γ
α
·
(
1− β
β
)
. (2)
Since G′ has a γ-bounded attack, we can write:
e(A′ ∩H,A′ ∩B)
d|A′ ∩H| ≤
e(A′ ∩H,A′ ∩ C)
volA′(A′ ∩H) ≤ γ . (3)
Combining the last two equations together we get:
|A′|
|A′ ∩B| =
|A′ ∩H|+ |A′ ∩B|
|A′ ∩B| ≥
e(A′ ∩H,A′ ∩B)
dγ|A′ ∩B| + 1 >
(
1− β
β
)
+ 1 =
1
β
,
where the first equality holds as A = (A ∩H) unionmulti (A ∩B), the second inequality
stems from Equation 3 and the third inequality stems from Equation 2. Flipping
the nominator and the denominator then gives β(A′) := |A
′∩B|
|A′| < β. 
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5 Discussion
We discuss implications of the theorem above to sparse graphs, relations between
the parameters α, β, and γ, and methods to estimate their values.
Sparse Graphs. Recall that the safety of the community growth relies upon
the parameters α, β, and γ. While a given community may evolve wrt. any
choice of parameters, some choices will inevitably yield degenerate outcomes; one
case is as we require Φ(G|A′) > γα ·
(
1−β
β
)
, while the conductance of any graph
is upper bounded by 12 . Specifically, whenever γ
(
1−β
β
)
> 12 , the community
cannot possibly grow, regardless of the choice of α. While complete graphs
and complete bipartite graphs are the classic examples of graphs which satisfy
Φ(G|A′) = 12 , the fact that their degree is of order d = Θ(n) makes them
unrealistic in our setting, where agents may potentially trust only a uniformly-
bounded number of identities. In this context, the main question seems to be the
following: Could a given community safely grow while retaining a given maximal
degree d? Surprisingly, not only that the answer is affirmative, it also holds for a
plethora of trust graphs. We utilize Friedman’s classical result:
Theorem 2. (Friedman [8], rephrased) Let G be a random d-regular graph on n
vertices. Then, for any 0 < , λ(G) ≤ 2
√
d−1
d +  holds with probability 1− on(1).
Thus, almost all d-regular graphs on n vertices satisfy λ2 ≤ 2√d . Applying
this term in Cheeger’s inequality (see Lemma 1) yields that such graphs satisfy
1
2
− 1√
d
≤ Φ , (4)
meaning that the choice of d affects the level of conductance one hopes to achieve.
Parameter Interplay. We consider numerical examples to better appreciate
the analysis above. First, consider the realistic assumption where each identity
is assumed to trust up to d = 100 identities (notice that this can be enforced
by the system). Equation 4 now suggests that a random graph of degree d on n
vertices (where d may be constant wrt. n) satisfies Φ > 25 . For simplicity, we take
this quantity as a benchmark. It follows that whenever γα ·
(
1−β
β
)
< 25 , there
exist a plethora of potential community histories for which a given community
may potentially grow to be arbitrarily large. Some further examples: (1) if
γ = 0, then any community history that begins with a connected Byzantine-
free community would retain 0-Byzantine penetration; (2) the choice β = 0 is
not attainable, corresponding to the intuition that we can never guarantee a
completely Byzantine-free community growth.
Figure 2 illustrates the parameter interplay further. Notice that our key
assumption, stating that honest people tend to trust honest people more than
they tend to trust corrupt people, implies that γ < β (as γ > β implies that honest
people trust corrupt people more than their relative share in the community).4
4 In a separate line of research (in preparation) we consider processes and mechanisms
that help lowering γ even further.
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Fig. 2. Parameter Interplay.
The large plot shows γ as a
function of β, for α = 1, where
each line represents a differ-
ent conductance Φ value. It
shows, e.g., that if the commu-
nity fixes α = 1 and sets Φ =
0.4, then to achieve β = 0.2
it can tolerate γ = 0.1. The
small plot shows the effect of
α, for Φ = 0.4. In both plots,
the red rectangles show respec-
tive β and γ values ensuring
σ = 0.05.
Parameter Estimation. While α and Φ can be decided by the community,
β(G) and γ rely on the dynamics of the community history. To incrementally
grow the community at a given time, one may settle for estimating the current
state of affairs, as follows. Specifically, assuming that a thorough examination of
a given identity could determine whether it is genuine or sybil, one may apply
random checks to empirically estimate β(G) and γ. This could be carried out in
the following manner: (1) examination of an identity x ∈ V determines whether
it is genuine or sybil; (2) examination of the neighbors of a genuine identity
x ∈ V (the ball of radius 1 around it) determines whether it is explicitly (but not
latently) corrupt; and (3) examination of the ball of radius 2 around an honest
identity x determines whether its neighbors are explicitly Byzantine.
6 Outlook
We proposed a method which allows an e-community to grow in a sybil-safe way.
Future research includes mechanisms to penalizing the creation of attack edges,
modeling the possibility of honest identities abandoning the community, and
using simulations to better understand the dynamics of safe growth.
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